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This Working Paper joint two previous article by the authors:  
 
The economic theory of exhaustible natural resources, in 
“Enciclopedia degli Idrocarburi”, vol. IV, Istituto della Enciclopedia 
Treccani, Roma, 2008, pp. 3-10; 
Technological innovation, relative scarcity, investments, in 
“Enciclopedia degli Idrocarburi”, vol. IV, Istituto della Enciclopedia 
Treccani, 2008, pp. 11-22
•. 
 
In the first one (cap. 1-4), we consider the contribution of economic 
theory (partly through a reevaluation of history) in order both to 
interpret and predict events, and to identify economic policies; this 
happens especially when the world economy feels the significant 
constraints imposed by some natural resources and raw materials, 
partly due to the rapid growth of a number of developing countries, 
and when there is an urgent need to increase resources rapidly to 
ensure continuing availability.  
Even if  the problem of scarce resources (of which natural resources 
are the most obvious  category) has been central to analysis for 
centuries, natural resource economics is contradictory. The main 
reason for this is that economic theory is out of step with prevailing 
economic conditions, as a consequence of the varying concern for a 
crucial phenomenon in the dynamics of economic systems: the 
opposition-coexistence of the scarcity of natural resources and the 
producibility of commodities. 
Natural resource economics can be summarized by dividing it into 
three main lines of thought: the theory of producibility and scarcity 
developed by classical economists; the theory of general and natural 
scarcities developed by marginalists and neoclassicals; the theory of 
dynamics with and without natural scarcities developed by 
macroeconomists, structuralists and empirical stylizers.  
Using this three-way subdivision, which is not clearly codified in 
                                                 
• We would like to thank the Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani for the permission 
to re-print here these articles.  4 
economic theory, the basic features of each approach will be 
examined with special attention to its early exponents. 
The historical starting point is the second half of the Eighteenth 
century, although we will ignore contributions such as those made by 
the Physiocrats who, during the same period, developed a theory of 
production based on the surplus generated by agriculture.  
 
In the second one (cap. 5-6), we consider that the role of 
technological innovation for resources use and conservation is often 
measured by empirical indicators of intensity or efficiency which 
express the evolution of resource use in relation to variables such as 
population and GDP. The historical evolution of these indicators 
tends to indicate a process of decoupling – in other words, a decrease 
in the energy/emissions intensity of economic activity or an increase 
in the efficiency/productivity of resource use.  
These empirical regularities have led to the proposition of stylized 
facts representing the relationships between resource-use efficiency 
and economic growth known as environmental Kuznets curves. 
However, the economic interpretations of the innovation mechanisms 
underlying the progress suggested by efficiency indicators, 
nonetheless, remain open and complex at the very time when there is 
increasing demand for further substantial advances in resource-use 
efficiency. We will survey the empirical evidence on the medium- 
and long-term dynamics of these indicators and will discuss their 
significance. This will be followed by an analysis of the possible role 
played by economic factors (especially resource prices and markets) 
and institutional factors (especially climate policy) in triggering and 
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PART I - The economic theory of exhaustible natural resources 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The contribution of economic theory (partly through a reevaluation 
of history) is important both to interpret and predict events, and to 
identify economic policies; this happens especially when the world 
economy feels the significant constraints imposed by some natural 
resources and raw materials, partly due to the rapid growth of a 
number of developing countries, and when there is an urgent need to 
increase resources rapidly to ensure continuing availability.  
Even if  the problem of scarce resources (of which natural resources 
are the most obvious  category) has been central to analysis for 
centuries, natural resource economics is contradictory. The main 
reason for this is that economic theory is out of step with prevailing 
economic conditions, as a consequence of the varying concern for a 
crucial phenomenon in the dynamics of economic systems: the 
opposition-coexistence of the scarcity of natural resources and the 
producibility  of commodities. This relationship is mediated by 
scientific and technological progress which, in the long run, has 
gradually reduced opposition and overcome scarcity until now.  
Over the long term, the distinction between exhaustible and 
renewable natural resources has been weak, since all resources have 
been renewed and augmented through substitution processes. 
Scarcities have therefore always been relative rather than absolute.  
Natural resource economics can be summarized by dividing it into 
three main lines of thought: the theory of producibility and scarcity 
developed by classical economists; the theory of general and natural 
scarcities developed by marginalists and neoclassicals; the theory of 
dynamics with and without natural scarcities developed by 
macroeconomists, structuralists and empirical stylizers.  
Using this three-way subdivision, which is not clearly codified in 
economic theory, the basic features of each approach will be 
examined with special attention to its early exponents. The literature 
on these themes is extensive, but in our opinion, the central issue 
remains unchanged: determining the influence of natural resource 8 
scarcity on growth processes. The subject thus has a specific focus 
and does not aim to provide a full overview.  
The historical starting point is the second half of the Eighteenth 
century, although we will ignore contributions such as those made by 
the Physiocrats who, during the same period, developed a theory of 
production based on the surplus generated by agriculture.  
This reevaluation will also closely follow some earlier studies 




2. Producibility and scarcity: the classical dynamics  
The years 1776 to 1871 saw the intellectual hegemony of the 
classical economists: Adam Smith, Thomas R. Malthus, David 
Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Their theory contained a grand design 
in which lie some fundamental principles for future reflections on the 
dynamics with natural resources. To summarize:  
The principle that the existence of a net product and its accumulation 
are necessary conditions for the growth of economic systems. The 
intensity and continuity of growth increases in line with progress 
which, in turn, depends on the ability, skill and good judgement of 
labour. So Smith (1776) insisted on man’s creative capacity, on the 
almost unlimited producibility of goods and means of production.  
The principle that there is a structural gap between population 
growth and the increase of food supply: as the former grows 
according to a geometrical progression, it increasingly diverges from 
the latter, which follows an arithmetical progression. Thus, Malthus 
(1798) introduced the absolute scarcity of natural agricultural 
resources, predicting a tragic end for the dynamics of economic 
systems and for humanity.  
The principle that in the dynamics of economic systems, the ongoing 
constraints imposed by limited natural resources could slow down or 
even halt growth, leading to a stationary state, if technical progress 
was insufficiently intense. Thus, Ricardo (1817) introduced the 
relative scarcity of natural resources, exploited in order of decreasing 
quality and on which technical progress could operate by limiting the 9 
constraints imposed by scarcity itself. This key principle in Ricardian 
theory has four other corollary principles: a) the rent is that part of 
the net product which can be attributed to the natural resource by 
virtue of the “original and indestructible powers” which it brings to 
the production process. It emerges as soon as the scarcity of the 
resource begins to condition production, and increases in the 
dynamic process which accentuates the scarcity itself; b) the price of 
the product generated by the natural resource (or, with reference to 
the Ricardian context, the price of corn produced by the land) also 
varies depending on the degree of scarcity, causing resort to 
increasingly less productive resources or expensive means of 
producing the same resource. As a result, price levels also change 
with economic dynamics, increasing in line with scarcity; c) the 
rational use of scarce resources implies that they are used in order of 
decreasing quality and productivity. This leads to the principle of 
diminishing returns; d) there is a relationship of interdependence 
between raw materials and commodities.  
The principle of the inevitability and desirability of the stationary 
state, since technical progress can only delay the moment at which 
the economy reaches this point. So, according to Mill (1848), a 
stationary state is not negative, but may represent an ideal balance, 
encouraging moral and social progress. No growth in the population 
or wealth should not be interpreted as no improvement. Considering 
the potential impact of quantitative growth on the Earth’s beauty, 
Mill hopes that man will choose a stationary state before being 
forced to do so by the exhaustion of resources resulting from 
population growth. In conclusion, Ricardo came closest to the 
opposition-coexistence paradigm. By reassessing Malthus’ 
extremism and limiting Smith’s optimism, he could have ascribed the 
essence of the dynamic workings of economic systems to the 
scarcity-producibility paradigm by admitting a process of continuous 
growth, albeit with phases of stagnation. Unfortunately, he was 
unable to fully exploit the concept of relative scarcity contained in 
his theory; by underestimating technical progress, he ended up 
predicting the advent of the stationary state without growth.  
This is classical theory (which is sketchy regarding many aspects 10 
but, nonetheless, magnificent) on the principles of creation of the 
social product; its distribution among wages, profits and rents; and 
its subdivision between consumption and investments, on which the 
growth of ‘the wealth of nations’ over time depends.  
The contributions of later economists develop some aspects of this 
theory and abandon others which subsequent insights will see as 
being of extreme importance.  
This discussion will be highly selective, making reference 
exclusively to those economists believed to be most innovative.  
 
 
3. From natural to general scarcities: marginalists and 
neoclassicals  
Marginalist theory, which dominated from 1871 to 1936, and 
neoclassical theory, which followed marginalist theory, are based on 
the pairing exchange-scarcity: given the scarcity of resources and 
individual preferences, all economic problems are resolved through 
the efficient use of these resources and exchange between the 
individuals who own them.  
Despite differences between the economists belonging to these two 
schools of thought and the necessity to oversimplify, we believe that 
they shared a general theory of stationary scarcity covering all 
production factors: land, labour and capital.  
This explains why problems relating to natural resources lose their 
specific identity, becoming particular instances of a general theory of 
scarcity and marginal productivity. It also explains the pivotal 
importance of studying the conditions which allow for the optimal 
use of resources (and not only natural resources) which constrain 
production and consumption in a stationary context. In a situation 
where all production factors are scarce, the role of land in the process 
of accumulation and of natural resources in processes of growth, 
does not require specific analysis. Nevertheless, even within this line 
of thought, there are some specific studies of natural resources, 
although these are not considered sufficiently important to form the 
basis for a general theory.  
 11 
3.1. Energy resources, intensive-extensive use, limitations on 
development  
The first contribution of note is by William Stanley Jevons (1865), 
also considered a forerunner of  marginalism. He predicted the end of 
British industrial supremacy due to the rapid exploitation and 
progressive depletion of mines, leading to a loss of competitiveness 
and development compared to other countries, richer in natural 
resources. Jevons believed that an increase in the energy efficiency 
of coal use could not prevent stagnation, since this would not lead to 
more preservation but to an increase in the scale of production and, 
thus, more consumption. Essentially, technical progress would lead 
to a less intensive use of coal which would be more than offset by its 
more extensive use. Jevons thus underestimated the potential of 
technical progress to identify and develop alternative energy sources, 
but his pioneering work highlighted a problem which is still 
important, concerning the constraints placed on a country’s 
development by the availability of energy resources.  
 
3.2. Use of natural resources and social well-being  
The second contribution, considered the foundation for all 
subsequent theories, is that of Harold Hotelling (1931). In his famous 
article, Hotelling attempts to  define the rate of depletion allowing 
the owner of an exhaustible resource to maximize obtainable profits.  
Since the resource stock is limited, an increase in current depletion 
entails a reduction in future depletion; to maximize profits, under 
conditions of perfect competition, the present value of the revenue of 
the resource in any given period, net of extraction costs, must be the 
same; otherwise it would be possible to increase profits by changing 
depletion in different periods. If extraction costs are negligible, the 
resource must be depleted so as to allow the price to grow in line 
with interest rates. With  this result, known as Hotelling’s rule, the 
ownership of an exhaustible resource is equivalent to the ownership 
of any other financial activity.  
Hotelling shows that competitive depletion is also socially optimal: 
the depletion rate of a mine which maximizes obtainable profits also 
allows for the maximization of the resource’s social value, whereas a 12 
monopoly leads to a lower rate of depletion than that which would be 
socially desirable. However, it is important to underline that 
Hotelling demonstrated the efficiency of the depletion rate under 
competitive conditions, defining social well-being in terms of 
resource consumption and discounting the benefits deriving from 
future consumption; this procedure could be heavily criticized for the 
different importance attributed to different generations.  
 
3.3. Non-renewable resources: constraints on growth and 
technical progress 
Hotelling’s work influenced an enormous quantity of  literature, 
especially during the 1970s, when the energy crisis became manifest 
in all its severity. Within this literature, which can be traced back to 
neoclassical aggregate growth models, two different lines of thought 
can be identified: one concerning renewable resources and the other 
concerning non-renewable resources. Both renewable and non-
renewable resources can be depleted; the former can be regenerated 
and thus decrease, increase or remain constant depending on the 
interactions between depletion and natural regeneration capacity; the 
latter are finite and the artificial regeneration process, or recycling, 
where possible, is conditioned by costs and technology.  
Below, this discussion will be limited to contributions concerning 
non-renewable resources. Since it is impossible to describe each 
individual study, their most important features will be summarized. 
Often fairly complex in formal terms, these contributions are similar 
for the techniques used, mainly the theory of optimal control, and the 
issues tackled. These concern both the problem of how best to 
deplete resources in accordance with the constraints imposed by the 
resource stock, the size of the work force and available technology, 
and the problem of ascertaining if limited availability may constrain 
potential growth.  
Since the continuous depletion of non-renewable resources 
inevitably leads to exhaustion, it becomes important to predict if 
economic activity is sustainable and whether a given level of per 
capita  consumption can be maintained (Stiglitz, 1974). Non-
renewable resources are a constraint when they are essential to 13 
production; however, this constraint may be mitigated by technical 
progress, which can lead to both lower consumption of the 
exhaustible resource and the potential for recycling, by lengthening 
the depletion period of the exhaustible resource. Above all, however, 
technical progress can allow for the substitution of these resources 
with others available now or in the future.  
Technical progress is thus crucial in order to counter the constraints 
imposed by non-renewable resources and studying the factors that 
encourage technological advances becomes fundamental. Although 
some works suggest that technical progress is exogenous, does not 
entail costs and proceeds steadily, in more realistic studies, technical 
progress depends on a series of decisions (research, investment, etc) 
which cannot be considered exogenous.  
However, despite the inevitable uncertainties regarding technology’s 
role in freeing us from the constraints imposed by non-renewable 
resources, many studies are characterized by an optimistic view of 
man’s inventive capacity. They thus aim to develop rules for non-
renewable resource management, so as to ensure that the decrease in 
stock is offset by an increase in investments in human capital, and to 
ensure the maintenance of a given level of production and 
consumption.  
 
3.4. Non-renewable resources and optimal depletion  
The optimal depletion of non-renewable resources can be defined in 
terms of both social and private goals.  
Socially optimal depletion must create the most socially desirable 
situation, and therefore requires the definition of those factors which 
influence social well-being. In such analyses, the most important 
problem derives from the fact that the term ‘social well-being’ is 
heavily debated. Social well-being depends on the availability of 
goods and services, but also on their distribution. Thus, evaluating 
social well-being involves a value judgement on the optimal 
distribution, both within a given generation and among different 
generations, posing the additional problem of what time interval to 
consider.  
Two specific concepts of well-being have frequently been adopted in 14 
the literature on social optimal exploitation. The utilitarian approach 
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1974) states that social well-being is maximum 
when the sum of the utilities due to consumption by different 
generations is maximum. The utility of future generations is thus 
discounted, a practice justified by some on the basis of uncertainty 
but heavily criticized by others for the different importance attached 
to different generations. The egalitarian approach (Solow, 1974b) is 
inspired by the rules of distributive justice upheld by John Rawls 
(1971), according to which the optimal path must equalize the well-
being of different generations at the highest possible level. If social 
well-being is determined on the basis of per capita consumption, 
well-being can be maximum only if per capita consumption is 
maximum and constant over time. These different concepts of social 
well-being have had a crucial influence on the definition of the 
optimal depletion policy.  
Studies aimed at determining the optimal depletion path for resource 
owners generally have as their objective the maximization of the 
profits obtainable from depletion. Since the depletion rate thus 
determined may differ from that which is socially desirable, analyses 
have been undertaken on the policies to be adopted in order to 
eliminate divergences and allow for resource depletion which is 
compatible with the maximization of social well-being.  
The determination of the optimal depletion rate from a private point 
of view also poses the problem of the best time-span to consider for 
the resource owner, despite the absence of the problems of 
distributive justice mentioned above. Since obtainable profits depend 
on the relationship between the price of the resource and depletion 
costs, this literature investigates the factors which influence these 
variables. In particular, attempts are made to: a) determine the 
depletion path and the price dynamics, with reference to different 
market regimes; b) analyse the changes in the optimal path, 
considering the potential substitution of the exhaustible resource with 
other resources, both exhaustible and renewable; c) analyse the 
potential for recycling and its costs; d) analyse the effect of changes 
in variations in extraction techniques, in the costs of depletion, in the 
prices of potential substitutes, in the estimates of reserves, in the rate 15 
of interest and in demographic dynamics. The variety of approaches 
makes it impossible to present a detailed analysis here, although it is 
worth considering some results referring to specific hypotheses, 
showing the conditions which are necessary along an optimal 
depletion path.  
 
3.5. Exploitation of non-renewable resources. Price and royalty 
dynamics: a simplified model  
A non-renewable resource differs from a normal commodity in that it 
is non-producible and is available in limited quantities. Current 
depletion thus has an opportunity cost, given by the benefit of using 
the resource in the future rather than at the present. This opportunity 
cost, also known as the royalty, must be taken into consideration in 
depletion decisions. It accounts for the difference between the 
normal requirement of efficiency in the use of producible resources 
(which implies that the price and the marginal extraction cost are 
identical) and in the use of exhaustible resources (whose price must 
be higher than the marginal extraction cost and thus equal to the 
depletion cost, plus the opportunity cost).  
A further condition for efficiency in the depletion of exhaustible 
resources concerns variations in royalty and price over time. If the 
depletion costs are negligible, the price of a unit of extracted, or 
surface, resource is equal to the price of a unit of resource in the 
ground, in other words to the royalty; as already shown by Hotelling, 
both must grow in line with interest rates. Even if the resource owner 
decides not to deplete it, he thus has an income because the value of 
the non-extracted resource grows at the rate of interest.  
When the marginal extraction cost is constant, the royalty grows at 
the rate of interest; since the price is equal to the sum of the royalty 
and the marginal extraction cost, its trends will depend on the weight 
of these two components. If the value of the royalty is initially low, 
that is the amount of available resource is high, the price of the 
resource (which is dependent on the marginal extraction cost, 
assumed to be constant) grows more slowly than the interest rate; the 
fact that the resource is exhaustible thus has a minimal impact. As 
time passes, however, since the royalty grows at the rate of interest, 16 
its impact on the surface price of the resource increases and the price 
thus tends to increase until its growth rate equals the interest rate. 
However, there is a limit on price increases which depends on the 
maximum marginal willingness to pay for the exhaustible resource: 
in many studies, this limit is represented by the price of a substitute. 
In the simplest models, optimal depletion must involve price 
increases so as to cancel out demand at the exact moment when the 
resource is exhausted, simply stating the end of the era of that 
resource (Solow, 1974a). If there are substitutes which are not 
currently competitive, optimal depletion must entail price increases 
to allow for the use of other previously unused resources, and the 
resource must be exhausted at the point when it becomes 
economically viable to use the substitute. If there are no current 
substitutes, optimal depletion must entail price increases to 
encourage both a greater efficiency in the use of the resource and 
greater investments in the search for alternative resources.  
 
3.6. Non-renewable resources: scarcity and efficiency  
The analytical scheme described above has been used to investigate 
how depletion paths should be modified. It considers that the 
depletion of exhaustible resources begins with the best and most 
easily accessible reserves, with effects on the dynamics of extraction 
costs; knowledge of the resource stock is limited, but can be 
improved by exploration and research activities.  
Further alterations in important parameters and functions have been 
introduced in later models in order to improve the analysis of non-
renewable resource depletion and make it more realistic. However, 
despite these innovations, contributions to this line of research seem 
directed more at analysing the problems posed by the scarcity of 
natural resources in terms of efficiency than in terms of constraints 






4. Dynamics with and without natural scarcities: 
macroeconomists, structuralists, stylizers  
Since economic theory never develops in a linear fashion, a single 
problem often attracts opposing, compatible or complementary theories. 
Thus, during the 1940s, while the neoclassicals continued their analysis, 
theories based on classical economics emerged successfully to tackle the 
dynamic phenomena of economic systems. The interest in this field had 
never completely disappeared, as demonstrated by Joseph Alois 
Schumpeter who developed a dynamic theory in 1911, which was 
elaborated upon during subsequent decades. However, it was probably 
the study by John Maynard Keynes (1936) which brought to the fore a 
macroeconomic approach based on the classicals (Pasinetti, 1977). It 
also became apparent during these years that technical progress had 
been continuous in the economies of industrialized countries for over a 
century, with increases in production capacity through accumulation. 
Below, we will examine some exponents of this approach, subdividing 
them into macroeconomists, optimistic structuralists and realistic 
structuralists, and empirical stylizers.  
 
4.1. Macroeconomists  
Roy Forbes Harrod (1939 and 1948) examines the accumulation of 
capital, the dynamics of the work force and technical progress. As far 
as natural resources and land are concerned, after essentially 
restating classical theory, Harrod accepts the theory of a driving 
force due to accumulation, but criticizes it for various aspects and 
abandons two: population dynamics, which for Harrod become 
exogenous; the dynamics of diminishing returns from land, which he 
considers quantitatively negligible so that he does not attribute a role 
to natural resources in his dynamic theory.  
In the neoclassical macrodynamic mould, Robert Solow (1956) 
assumes that there are no scarce resources which cannot be 
augmented, stating that the introduction of a scarce earth factor 
would obviously lead to Ricardian diminishing returns. Essentially, 
these reformulations of dynamic theory underestimate scarce 
resources, as it is evident also in important reviews of growth 
theories (Hahn and Matthews, 1965).  18 
4.2. Optimistic structuralists  
Optimistic structuralists develop multisectoral models. The first in 
chronological order, in 1937, is John von Neumann (1945-1946), 
who tackles the problem of maximum growth; albeit with numerous 
significant differences, he also lays the foundations for the approach 
based on industrial interdependencies adopted by Wassily Leontief 
(1941 and 1953). Other economists proceed along the same lines, 
including Luigi Lodovico Pasinetti (1965 and 1981).  
For von Neumann, goods are products not only by natural production 
factors but, above all, by themselves. This means that natural 
production factors, including labour, do not pose problems for 
growth. The limitations on scale imposed by natural production 
factors is thus denied, although their role in production is recognized.  
Leontief is more cautious, although whilst considering all sectors 
which treat raw materials in his theoretical and empirical work, he 
does not examine the limitations of scale imposed by natural 
resources on the production system. In this context, he writes: 
“Invisible in all these tables, but ever present as […] a whole 
additional set of factors determining this country’s [the USA’s] 
productive capacity and, in particular, its comparative advantage vis-
à-vis the rest of the world, are the natural resources […] Absence of 
systematic quantitative information, similar to that which has been 
collected […] with respect to capital and labour, prevents us as yet 
from introducing this important element explicitly into this 
preliminary analysis” (Leontief, 1953, p. 96). 
 
Pasinetti is another economist who has developed multisectoral 
models, but without considering natural resources and the constraints 
which these place on dynamics. However, he does consider 
accumulation, technical progress, the distribution of income and 
human capital.  
These structural theories represent extremely important 
contributions to an understanding of dynamics, technologies, 
technical progress and accumulation. However, they lie at the 
opposite extreme to the marginalist approach, moving from 
generalized static scarcity to absolute dynamic producibility and 19 
ignoring relative dynamic scarcity, in which natural resources 
matter. The return to the classicals is thus more Smithian than 
Ricardian. Of the pairing scarcity-producibility, more importance is 
attributed to the latter in the often implicit belief that technical 
progress and the rapid growth of industrialized economies 
eliminates the constraints imposed by resources. These authors are 
therefore fundamentally optimistic. 
 
4.3. Realistic structuralists  
A structural theory which espouses the role of land and raw materials 
is that of Piero Sraffa (1960), developed as early as the 1930s. This 
theory deals mainly with the relationships between the distribution of 
income (salaries, profits, rents), the prices of commodities and raw 
materials, and the choice of production techniques in a one-period 
context.  
This theory, described as neo-Ricardian by some, devotes little space 
to natural resources, but borrows some important categories from the 
classicals. This leads to subsequent theories including natural 
resources which, for dynamic analysis, have also made use of 
variations on multisectoral models like those developed by von 
Neumann and Leonfief. We refer in particular to the approach 
adopted by Alberto Quadrio Curzio (1967) and taken up in studies by 
other authors (for a review: Quadrio Curzio et al., 1996; Quadrio 
Curzio, 1997), including those by Quadrio Curzio and Fausta 
Pellizzari (1981 and 1996) which includes all the previous 
contributions, also dealing with many other problems. These works 
are about natural resources and raw materials in multisectoral 
production theories, both one-period and dynamic. Two sets of 
production sectors are considered, with analytical simplifications: in 
the first set, each specific sector produces a single commodity with 
the use of commodities and produced means of production; the 
second set comprises sectors which also make use of non-produced 
means of production, i.e. natural resources (such as land) and which 
generate raw materials (such as corn), also used as means of 
production in the first set of sectors.  
These studies do not consider the isolated instance of a single natural 20 
resource, but rather the productive interdependence of the whole 
economy, prices and the distribution of income. As such, the theory 
has four central categories.  
Natural resources and raw materials. The most obvious distinction 
is between reproducible and non-reproducible resources, not always 
crucial considering the long-term substitutability linked to technical 
progress. In other words, not everything comes down to the 
distinction between land and agricultural raw materials (renewable) 
on the one hand, and mineral deposits (exhaustible) on the other.  
In a one-period context, the difference between reproducibility and 
non-reproducibility loses significance. A mineral deposit, measured 
in terms of volume or surface units per unit of raw material 
produced, has the same impact on production as land does on corn. 
Furthermore, several deposits are usually in production given the 
limited extraction capacity of each, per given time unit, compared to 
the level of production required. This is the case for lands of 
differing quality.  
In a dynamic long-term context, all natural resources are historically 
reproducible, since scientific and technical progress has always 
moved the constraints imposed by scarcity forwards, albeit with slow 
growth and complex substitution mechanisms. For this reason, the 
distinction between reproducible and non-reproducible resources in 
the long term is not, historically, crucial.  
Intensive rents and extensive rents. Rents are coessential with natural 
resources and are part of the net national product which can be 
attributed to scarce resources. There are two types of well-known 
rents from scarce natural resources: intensive and extensive. 
Restricting this discussion to extensive rents, which may include 
intensive rents, these emerge when two or more natural resources of 
differing quality are in activity, each producing a homogeneous raw 
material.  
The analysis of rents establishes two orders for scarce natural 
resources: the order of efficiency and the order of rentability. The 
first depends on costs per unit of product and on production per 
hectare, and is the one adopted in producing lands. The second 
explains how rents behave in already active processes, when the 21 
economic system’s level of activity grows by increasing the number 
of land processes in operation.  
Techniques and compound technologies. Techniques are 
characterized by a multiplicity of interdependent sectors, each using 
a natural resource and producing a raw material involved directly or 
indirectly in the production of all other commodities. Technologies, 
on the other hand, are n active techniques, since each has a maximum 
production scale restricted by the scarcity of the natural resource 
used.  
This concept also leads to an analysis of how the technology is 
modified within the dynamics as a result of the existence of non-
produced natural resources and means of production. On the basis of 
a compound technologies scheme, with a multiplicity of techniques 
each characterized by a non-produced natural resource or means of 
production, the composition  of these techniques in processes of 
accumulation and growth is analysed. This involves a complex 
analysis of orders of efficiency (dynamic-physical, dynamic-values 
and dynamic prices-distribution) among techniques and thus their 
order of activation in accumulation and in the dynamics itself. This 
results in various dynamics which are non-proportional due to the 
different structure of technologies, depending on the size of 
production surpluses which cannot be accumulated.  
Technical-technological progress. Technological  scarcity is 
inversely related to technical progress. A  complex series of technical 
progresses is identified (structural, natural, linear, absolute, relative) 
since in the compound technologies model, progress can only be 
classified through reference to numerous variables. The distinction 
between progress in a technique and in a technology makes it 
possible to evaluate the interrelationships between technical and 
technological progress. This distinction also makes it possible to 
determine the consequences of these progresses regarding the extent 
to which the economic system can accumulate and grow, and weaken 
the constraints imposed by non-produced means of production.  
This structural analysis, whilst certainly schematic and incomplete, 
clearly shows elements of realism. It takes into account the 
constraints imposed by natural resource scarcity, as well as historical 22 
reality, in the classification of different types of technical progress. It 
should not be forgotten that historically, the constraints imposed by 
natural resources have always been overcome in the long term.  
 
4.4. Empirical stylizers  
This name covers a variety of different types of  analysis which share 
stylized historical or quantitative methods, extremely important in 
reducing the gap between the abstractions of pure theory and the full 
description of phenomena. This has led to the construction of an 
extremely important semitheory which has produced some 
significant results and complements to pure theory.  
The first line of research of interest here is the historical-quantitative 
study of growth and development, which gathered momentum in the 
1930s with the fundamental contributions by Simon Kuznets (for a 
brief overview: Kuznets, 1990).  
 
Kuznets believes that attention should again be focused on long-term 
dynamics, in the mould of the classical economists, and on century-
long dynamics which contain shorter cycles. The historical-
quantitative approach is extended by Kuznets, in his numerous later 
works, to other central issues in development such as: a) the relations 
between demographic trends and economic development; b) the 
influence of technological innovations; c) structural transformations; 
d) historical tendencies to inequalities in income; e) the accumulation 
of capital; and f ) the limited international spread of development.  
This historical-quantitative theory thus shows the complexity of 
development, dealing with natural resources and the environment 
when: examining the structural transformations of the economy and 
agriculture; examining the accumulation of capital; analysing 
technological innovations and their importance for energy and 
industrial activities; analysing the impact of innovations on the 
environment.  In short, it can be said that Kuznets is optimistic 
regarding the ability of technologies to respond, through adaptation 
mechanisms, even to the negative effects on the environment which 
they may cause. The other line of analytical-quantitative thought 
worth mentioning here is Leontief’s (1977), applied to natural 23 
resources. It should be remembered that his contribution has been 
included by some in the category of large global predictive models 
which originated in the 1970s. This pairing seems unconvincing, 
partly because whilst Leontief bases his work on economic theory, 
global models are non-theoretical predictions, and partly because 
Leontief, to some extent, reacts against those global models which 
make extremely pessimistic predictions about the exhaustion of 
natural resources and the fear that the world economy will collapse. 
These models support the concept of an absolute scarcity of natural 
resources, leading to proposals that a generic condition of ecological 
and economic stability should be attained, a sort of stationary state 
(Meadows  et al., 1972). Leontief develops a model of the world 
economy based on the economic theory of input-output, reaching the 
conclusion that natural resources-raw materials determine a 
condition of relative scarcity. The model consists of various 
interconnected input-output submodels relating to different parts of 
the world, analysing the interrelationships between the production 
and consumption of goods and services, and that of natural resources. 
Leontief’s conclusion is very similar to that of Kuznets, and can be 
summarized as follows: “the principal limits to sustained economic 
growth and rapid development are political, social and institutional in 
character rather than physical. No insurmountable physical barriers 
exist within the Twentieth century to the accelerated development of 
the developing regions ” (Leontief et al., 1977, pp. 10-11).  
 
A new interest in global modelling has emerged in parallel with 
environmental concerns when these have been perceived as dangers 
of a systemic global nature in recent years. Alongside the increasing 
production of global ecological models – especially those for 
climate, and large multidisciplinary models of the large-scale 
interactions between ecological and social systems – there has been a 
resumption of global modelling in the 1970s mould, or similar to it, 
mentioned but not dealt with in detail here.  
In conclusion, we believe that there is a continuing opposition 
between approaches dealing with global constraints and absolute 
scarcity, and those dealing with relative scarcity. This divergence 24 
results from the different evaluations of the potential impact of 
innovation and its generation mechanisms, which still appears to be 
the element of major division between the two approaches, even in 
their most recent environmentally-oriented form.  
 
 




5. Innovation and resource use efficiency: stylized facts  
The role of technological innovation for resources use and 
conservation is often measured by empirical indicators of intensity or 
efficiency which express the evolution of resource use in relation to 
variables such as population and GDP. The historical evolution of 
these indicators tends to indicate a process of decoupling – in other 
words, a decrease in the energy/emissions intensity of economic 
activity or an increase in the efficiency/productivity of resource use. 
These empirical regularities have led to the proposition of stylized 
facts representing the relationships between resource-use efficiency 
and economic growth known as environmental Kuznets curves 
(Stern, 2004), given their similarities with the regularities identified 
by Simon Kuznets (1955) in the long-term relationships between 
economic growth and the distribution of income.  
The importance of these indicators lies also in the fact that some 
international and national institutions use them to evaluate the 
effectiveness of energy-environmental policies and sustainability 
strategies (IEA, 1997, 2001a,b; OECD, 2002; DEFRA/DTI, 2003; 
EEA, 2003).  
Furthermore, some countries tend to set intensity/efficiency targets 
for important policies; an example is the target on emissions intensity 
in relation to GDP adopted by the United States in its own climate 
policy as an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol target based on 
emission levels.  
However, the economic interpretations of the innovation mechanisms 
underlying the progress suggested by efficiency indicators, 25 
nonetheless, remain open and complex at the very time when there is 
increasing demand for further substantial advances in resource-use 
efficiency. This chapter will survey the empirical evidence on the 
medium- and long-term dynamics of these indicators and will discuss 
their significance. This will be followed by an analysis of the 
possible role played by economic factors (especially resource prices 
and markets) and institutional factors (especially climate policy) in 
triggering and supporting progress in the use efficiency of energy 
resources.  
 
5.1. Decoupling indicators and environmental Kuznets curves: 
meaning and limitations  
With reference to a scheme of type I=P⋅A⋅T,
1 
the total impact (I, e.g. 
the consumption of energy) can be expressed as the product of the 
impacts of population P, affluence A, i.e. the level of development 
measured by per capita GDP, and of the impact per unit of economic 
activity, i.e. I/GDP, as an indicator of the system’s technology, T. 
Thus formulated, this is an accounting identity, useful for the 
decomposition analysis of the relative role of P,  A  and  T  in the 
evolution of I over time or its differing levels in different countries.  
The role of P  and  A  as pressure factors (generally increasing) 
pushing I to increase is obvious, whereas T is an intensity indicator 
which measures how many ‘impact units’ are required by an 
economic system (or by a sector) to produce one unit (one euro) of 
GDP. It is therefore a technical coefficient which, if referred to the 
system, represents its overall efficiency in the use of a given resource 
and expresses the average state of technology in a highly stylized 
way. A decrease in T over time indicates an increase in efficiency, 
and may be considered a direct indicator of decoupling between 
economic activity and resource use.  
IPAT-like schemes highlight three features of decoupling analysis 
and Kuznets curves. First, if the dynamics of T alone are examined, 
this may provide misleading indications of the crucial or even 
                                                 
1 Starting from Ehrlich’s formulation (1971), numerous variants of this scheme have 
been used to study the dynamics of global resources, especially in relation to 
population. 26 
exclusive role of technological innovation for resource-related 
problems. The decrease in T may be strong, but I may be stable or 
increasing if increasing efficiency is insufficient to offset the scale 
effect caused by the growth of P and A. The reverse may also occur 
in phases when poor economic growth (decrease in A) causes I to 
decrease, but not T, as was the case in Eastern Europe and Russia at 
the beginning of the ‘transition to the market’ in the 1990s. 
Therefore, a decrease in I is always a positive sign for resources, but 
it may not result from a structural improvement in the specific 
efficiency of resource use (i.e. in T); by contrast, a decrease in T 
always indicates a structural increase in efficiency, but does not 
necessarily mean that total resource use (i.e. I) is declining. The 
ambiguous implications of decreases in T are important, for example, 
in the case of global greenhouse gas emissions, where T is deceasing 
(efficiency is increasing) but I is increasing. This is important, for 
example, in appraising the United States climate policy, which sets a 
target for the emissions intensity of GDP, i.e. for T, in contrast to the 
emissions level target, i.e. for I, adopted by the Kyoto Protocol. In 
this case, even significant achievements on the T-based targets do not 
necessarily mean a successful policy in terms of I, which is the 
environmentally relevant variable.  
Second, although a decrease in T indicates that something positive is 
occurring in the system, this must be explained in technological and 
economic terms. In the IPAT scheme outlined above, it is assumed 
that the variables P, A and T are independent of one another. In fact, 
the dynamics of economic systems show that these three variables 
are interdependent, due to a series of direct and indirect causal links 
and, over the medium to long term, to dynamic feedback 
mechanisms. For example, the evidence suggests that population 
dynamics (P) depend partly on the dynamics of per capita income 
(A) and, to some degree, vice versa
2.
 
Similar relationships and 
feedback mechanisms also emerge for T, whose dynamics may 
depend on GDP (per capita), and vice versa if T  refers to a key 
                                                 
2 For a survey of the different viewpoints of economists on the positive or negative 
effect of population on economic growth: Zoboli, 1996.  27 
resource such as energy. Furthermore, the dynamics of I may also 
influence that of T if the scarcity signalled by the impact stimulates, 
through the markets (relative prices) or policies, processes of 
invention, innovation and diffusion of new technologies, resulting in 
specific efficiency in the use of that resource. In practice, a decrease 
in T reflects a complex combination of economic and technological 
micro- and macro-processes, including dynamic feedback 
mechanisms, which are of a heterogeneous, non-deterministic and 
partially endogenous nature. These will be discussed in detail in the 
remainder of this analysis. Third, Environmental Kuznets Curves 
(EKC) concern precisely some of the relationships mentioned above, 
for example, between I  and GDP or between T  and GDP (per 
capita); however, though they may supply empirical regularities of 
great heuristic interest, they do not provide a satisfactory economic 
explanation for them. The hypothesis suggested by the EKC is, in 
short, that an inverted U relationship between resource consumption 
and  per capita GDP can be documented for a certain number of 
resources, pollutants and energy sources. Consumption (of energy) or 
emissions (of pollutants) initially increase when levels of economic 
development are relatively low, since a scale effect, driven by A and 
P, prevails; they later tend to decrease more or less proportionally 
when levels of economic development are higher, becoming 
decoupled from per capita GDP due to the predominance of an 
efficiency effect driven by T
3.
 
Like its original Kuznetsian 
formulation for income distribution, this hypothesis is based not on a 
theoretical model but on an insight originating from, and supported 
by, empirical evidence. Only recently have some studies attempted to 
formulate the EKC hypothesis in formalized models (Andreoni and 
Levinson, 2001; Chimeli and Braden, 2005).  
This discussion will not cover the theoretical formalization and 
different formulations of EKCs. It is worth noting, however, that if 
the formulation concerns a relationship between I  and GDP (per 
capita), the analysis of EKCs supplies the same information as the 
                                                 
3 For a presentation of EKCs with a discussion of the main hypotheses and empirical 
evidence: De Bruyn et al., 1998. Detailed surveys of the literature are presented in: 
Dasgupta et al., 2002; Dinda, 2004; Stern, 2004. 28 
analysis of T. Furthermore, if an EKC relationship between I and 
GDP (per capita) is hypothesized, there must also be one between T 
and GDP because P  and GDP always increase (with some 
exceptions) in the medium-long term, and decoupling must therefore 
have occurred at some level of GDP. By contrast, if there is an EKC 
relationship between T  and GDP (per capita), this does not 
necessarily mean that there is a similar relationship between I and 
GDP, since P and GDP may have driven I more than could be offset 
by the decrease in T. This is true, for example, for global CO2 
emissions (see below).  
The main limitation is that by identifying GDP (per capita) alone as 
the principal explanatory variable, the analysis of EKCs suffers from 
the same limitations as the analysis of decoupling, or of T, but with 
an additional danger. The empirical evidence provided by EKC 
relationships might actually give the misleading impression that 
rapid growth towards high levels of per capita GDP automatically 
leads to efficient resource use, and that the best policy for reducing 
their environmental impact is economic growth. However, the IPAT 
scheme indicates that a growth in GDP (per capita) necessarily leads 
also to a scale effect on resource consumption and emissions for each 
level of T and P.  
Generally speaking, only if the negative effects of  the increase in 
GDP (per capita) on T are constantly higher than its positive effect 
on  I, can the process of  economic growth lead to an absolute 
decrease in I, assuming the effect of population growth as given
4. 
This is important for global energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions, given the rapid growth of  population and income in 
developing countries. The negative elasticity of T on the growth of 
per capita  GDP will need to be extremely high in the near future, 
due to a stationary or even increasing T in many of these countries, in 
order to avoid a possible ‘catastrophe of scale’ resulting from the 
dynamics of income and population. Therefore, although the 
                                                 
4 If I=f (P, A, T), where A is an indicator of economic development, with ∂I/∂A, 
∂I/∂P, ∂I/∂T>0 and T=g(A), with dT/dA<0, the total derivative of I on A will be 
negative if ∂I/∂A•∂I/∂TdT/dA, i.e. if the direct positive effect of A on I is less than 
the negative effect of A on T, given the effect of T on I. 29 
relationship between economic growth and environmental efficiency 
is an important stylized fact, economic growth remains only an 
implicit explanation of environmental efficiency and does not 
obviate the need for explicit strategies to improve T through specific 
innovations.  
 
5.2. Indicator trends and empirical analyses  
Indicators of energy intensity/efficiency and of emissions from 
energy sources (i.e. T in the above scheme) have been monitored for 
years by various international bodies (such as the IEA, International 
Energy Agency), national agencies (such as the US Department of 
Energy, DOE) and other institutions. Despite a constantly increasing 
energy consumption, the emerging trends are towards an increasing 
energy intensity of GDP (primary sources) only in those developing 
countries with low development but rapid growth, and a constantly 
decreasing energy intensity of GDP in all other countries. 
The consumption of primary energy per unit of GDP was already 
decreasing by the late Nineteenth century in the United Kingdom, 
and by the 1920s and 1930s in the United States, Germany and 
France. In Italy, delayed industrialization led the energy intensity of 
GDP to increase until the 1950s, although it remained structurally 
low in comparison to other countries, followed by decreasing 
intensity from then until the present. From the 1970s, coinciding with 
the oil shocks, these trends were further consolidated, spreading to 
all developed countries. In Germany, for example, real GDP 
increased by 50% between 1970 and the early 1990s, whereas the 
consumption of primary energy remained almost constant.  
The decline in the energy intensities (primary sources) has recently 
involved numerous developing countries still in the initial phases of 
industrialization. In China, for example, despite an enormous 
increase in the demand for energy, the reforms in the late 1970s, 
aimed at raising energy prices, led the energy intensity of national 
income to decrease by 50% between 1980 and the late 1990s (Zhang, 
2000).  
Numerous studies have investigated the general and specific factors 
involved in the decrease of energy intensities over time. Generally 30 
speaking, decreases in individual developed countries can be 
ascribed to: changes in the sectorial mix of the production structure, 
especially the relatively decreasing weight of energy intensive 
sectors, partially reflecting changes in the division of labour between 
countries on a global scale; substitution between sources and changes 
in the energy mix, resulting in higher economic output at any given 
level of total energy consumption; specific technological innovations 
for energy conservation and efficiency.  
The decline in the energy intensity of output has led to a parallel 
decrease in the intensity of CO2  emissions in relation to GDP, 
magnified by the ‘decarbonization’ of energy consumption through a 
continuous transition towards sources with lower specific emissions. 
In the United States, the carbon intensity of primary energy 
consumption has fallen by 0.25% per year since 1800, whereas the 
corresponding decrease worldwide has been 0.3% from 1850 
(Gruebler et al., 1999).  
These efficiency processes intensified significantly after the 1970s, 
when energy price increases and the resulting perception of energy 
scarcity led to the adoption of technological strategies and policies to 
encourage energy conservation (Martin, 1990; Casler and Afrasiabi, 
1993; Rosenberg, 1994, 1996). In some cases, decreasing intensity 
and greater energy efficiency derived from non-specific innovations.  
These include changes in material use in some sectors which, as a 
result of lightness and dematerialization, have led to lower energy 
requirements for the same function. Similar developments towards 
greater use efficiency in relation to GDP have emerged for most 
industrial materials. In the case of minerals and metals – which have 
historically seen the coexistence of materials whose use intensity 
increased and decreased in relation to GDP – the 1970s represented a 
turning point, and the worldwide decline in use intensity has 
extended to almost all metals (Tilton, 1989; Considine, 1991; Labson 
and Cropton, 1993; Fortis, 1994). Towards the end of the 1990s, the 
decline in energy intensity slowed in many countries, which can 
broadly be attributed to decreases in the real prices of fossil fuels; 
however, this did not reverse the basic trend towards greater 
efficiency (see below).  31 
Although this evidence supports the idea that there is a Kuznets 
curve for energy, the studies of EKCs have mainly concerned 
emissions of pollutants and the greenhouse effect, in connection with 
policies to combat climate change. The first studies on the 
relationships between atmospheric emissions and income in the quest 
for a Kuznets curve date back to the early 1990s (Holtz-Eakin and 
Selden, 1992; Ten Kate, 1993; Grossman and Krueger, 1994; Selden 
and Song, 1994). These were followed by numerous studies debating 
the statistical-econometric aspects and the economic interpretation of 
environmental Kuznets curves (Yandle et al., 2002), gradually 
calling into question the reliability of the empirical evidence
5. 
In the case of CO2  emissions from fossil fuels, the tendency to 
decouple from economic development has been studied with 
divergent results, both for individual countries and globally. This 
results partly from the small time span considered and from the fact 
that these studies deal with cross-country data for a limited number 
of years. On the other hand, if a long or very long time span is 
considered, such as that shown in Fig. 1, clear indications emerge, at 





                                                 
5 For some environmental problems, such as waste production, there is no evidence 
for progress in line with a Kuznets curve (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005a). 32 
This shows that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels have decoupled from 
global GDP since the 1970s, reflecting the structural changes which 
had occurred for energy. However, emissions continue to increase 
and the decoupling is therefore ‘relative’, i.e. a decrease in emission 
intensity, rather than ‘absolute’. This is due to the impact of other 
macrofactors such as population and real per capita income, which 
have not been offset enough by increased efficiency. Albeit with 
some differences, this is the situation in most individual countries.  
Figs. 2 and  3  show the same processes in a very long term 
perspective, from 1870 to 2000, in terms of Kuznets curves
6. 
Emissions continue to increase as real global GDP grows, although 
to a lesser extent, and there is thus no Kuznets curve for emission 
levels. However, an EKC relationship does appear to exist for 
emissions intensity, which presents a roughly inverted U compared 
to real GDP, as predicted by the theory. If efficiency represents the 
state of technology, innovations and structural changes in economic 
systems have had continuous and significant effects over the past 
fifty years, but these remain insufficient compared to the demand for 
innovation needed to stabilize or decrease the level of emissions. 
                                                 
6 In Figs. 2 and 3, the data on emissions from fossil sources are those produced by 
CDIAC (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center). The data on GDP are drawn 
from the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
database. The data published by the OECD for real global GDP are estimates by 
Angus Maddison for the years 1870, 1900, 1913 and time series from 1950 to 2000. 
The data for the years 1871-1899 and 1901-1912 are our extrapolations based on the 
assumption of a constant average annual growth rate between the two available 
years. The data for the period 1914-1949, given the instability of the world economy 
during this period, which makes a constant growth rate an unrealistic assumption, 
are our estimates. It has been assumed that global GDP is proportional, in every year 
of the range, to the total GDP of a set of 44 countries in Maddison’s database, 
representing 68% of global GDP in 1913 and 71% in 1950. It should be noted that 
the same countries, including the major industrialized nations, account for between 




6. The mechanisms of technological innovation for energy 
and the environment  
The trend of the indicators examined above suggest the working 
of innovation for natural resources, but only offer an implicit 
explanation of the mechanisms by which innovation itself 
emerges and operates. If, on the one hand, innovation for energy 
and emissions conforms to normal innovation mechanisms 
(Malerba, 2000), on the other, it also concerns the use of scarce 
resources and therefore conforms to the model of  
“innovation scarcity” outlined in Chapter 1.2. Specifically, the 
innovation is influenced by: a) specific signs of relative scarcity 
emerging from the markets and prices that possibly lead to 
specific resource-use innovations; b) the numerous public 
policies adopted by all countries in these sectors; c) 
macroeconomic dynamics and structural changes in economic 
systems;  d) general innovations in other fields. In turn, 
innovative processes for resources influence all these sectors to 
some extent. 
The hypothesis of ‘induced innovation’, originally formulated by 
John Hicks in the 1930s in the contextof economic 
macrodynamics, is currently being rediscovered and applied to 
the impact of markets and prices on innovation
7. 
This hypothesis suggests that a change in the relative prices of 
factor inputs tends to generate technological innovation which 
reduces the use of the factor whose price has increased relative to 
that of other factors.  
This hypothesis provides results not dissimilar to those of the 
multisectoral models of rents, growth and the distribution of 
income described in Chapter 1.2, although quantity variables 
play a central role in the dynamics theorized in the latter 
(Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari, 1996, 1999). The Hicksian 
induced innovation hypothesis has had numerous theoretical and 
applied developments in the recent past (Ruttan and Hayami, 
                                                 
7 More precisely, the Hicksian hypothesis refers to ‘induced invention’ (Hicks, 
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1985; Kemp, 1997; Ruttan, 2002; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005b, 
2006), and has been reproposed by numerous recent models of 
‘endogenous innovation’ applied to energy and climate policies 
(Carraro et al., 2003). 
The discussion below will cover two specific contexts where the 
hypothesis of induced innovation may apply: the role of prices 
on energy efficiency and the role of public policies, especially 
climate change policies, on emissions efficiency. 
 
6.1. Relative prices and technological innovation  
The exceptional increases in energy and raw materials prices in 
the 1970s resulted not only in structural changes in economies 
and innovative processes of a systemic nature with an impact on 
the overall efficiency of resource use, but also in specific induced 
innovations aimed at conserving the resources which the markets 
indicated to be scarce (Quadrio Curzio, 1983; Sylos Labini, 
1984; Quadrio Curzio et al., 1994; Mokyr, 1995; Quadrio Curzio 
and Zoboli, 1995a,b; Rosenberg, 1996; Quadrio Curzio and 
Zoboli, 1997; Popp, 2002). 
The interpretation of relative energy prices as the main driving 
force towards energy-related innovations, however, has been 
undermined by events over the past two decades. The fall in the 
real prices of energy after the mid-1980s has not led to an inverse 
innovation process in which energy, now less scarce, replaces 
other production factors. Again, using general indicators, Fig. 4 
shows that the strong price increase in the 1970s led to a decline 
in the intensity of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, closely 
linked to the consumption of primary energy; however, the fall in 
real prices which followed did not change the declining trend of 
energy-emissions intensity, which still continues. 
Although this pattern may be influenced by expectations 
regarding climate policies, which might have prevented 
abandoning the paths of energy-emission saving, efficiency’s 
inertia is too strong for it not to have more structural 
explanations. 36 
Whereas in a narrow neoclassical economics view, this lack of 
symmetry would argue against relative prices playing a crucial 
role, in a structural and evolutionist view, this may be an 
important indication of the nature of induced innovation 





Most innovations which conserve energy and raw materials are 
incorporated in medium and long-term capital goods (such as 
industrial plants, vehicles and houses); this may explain both a 
degree of slowness in the adoption and diffusion of currently 
available energy efficiency solutions, and the poor reversibility, 
for a considerable time, of the efficiency gains acquired. 
Analysing energy efficiency mechanisms over the long term, 
Rosenberg (1994) suggests that even if different energy sources 
can be easily substituted with each other, and it is possible to 
conserve energy without significantly altering processes and 
products, the attainment of a greater energy efficiency always 
requires some capital investment. As a consequence, increases in 
efficiency tend to be slow despite the availability of energy 
conservation technologies and the strong pressure to conserve 
exerted by markets and prices. The reason is that although these 37 
technologies meet the criterion of lowering the specific costs of 
energy inputs, they do not lower total costs since they entail 
investment costs. Only in proximity to capital renewal cycles 
and/or when energy prices are extremely high and expected to 
remain so for a long 
time, is the adoption of these technologies beneficial in terms of 
total costs. 
Mechanisms of this type emerge with great complexity in the 
construction sector, whose energy consumption accounts for 
about 40% of the European Union (EU) total. The adoption of 
available energy saving technologies in constructions could lead 
to a reduction of a fifth compared to current levels
8. 
However, in this sector, numerous variables affect decisions to 
invest in efficiency, the agents making these decisions are 
heterogeneous, and there are difficulties in measuring efficiency 
compared to other sectors. For new buildings, the decision to 
incorporate energy efficiency is taken by the builder or by the 
owner. In both cases, the fundamental economic problem is to 
get the market to recognize the property’s increased value due to 
the investment in efficiency, which leads to lower consumption 
and cost savings throughout the property’s useful life. 
Investment in retrofitting constitutes a fundamentally different 
problem from an economic standpoint, since this entails 
choosing when to make the investment, if it is worth making at 
all. Generally speaking, current energy prices have more impact 
on this type of investment than future prices. This is because they 
influence total costs during the possible period of non-adoption, 
which is closest to the present and thus more weighted, since 
costs are discounted to present value. The interesting aspect of 
retrofitting costs is that if they are expected to fall sufficiently 
fast in the future, retrofitting is postponed. Therefore, even if the 
present value of expected energy savings is higher than the 
present cost of retrofitting (i.e. if the net benefit is positive), the 
                                                 
8 This would be equivalent to a 10% saving in net imports of petroleum 
products, and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions equal to 20% of the 
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technology may not be adopted if technological innovation is 
continuous and fairly rapid, or if future public incentives (which 
reduce adoption costs) are expected to be higher than current 
ones (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). 
This example shows that not only current prices but also 
expectations regarding prices may play a significant role in the 
substitution of capital with other capital that incorporates greater 
efficiency. Even if these price expectations later turn out to be 
wrong, with lower cost savings than those expected due to falling 
prices, once greater efficiency is attained, it is still more 
expensive to return to lower efficiency than to maintain that 
acquired; this is since the energy saved has a positive value, 
regardless of its price. If strong price increases have induced 
investment in capital which incorporates efficiency, a change 
which produces lower signs of scarcity (i.e. a price decrease) 
may slow down the adoption and diffusion of efficient 
technologies, but is unlikely to lead to a reverse towards lower 
efficiency. This is all the more true for changes like those which 
took place after the 1970s, which radically reconfigured 
advanced technological and economic systems. Specifically, the 
greatest inertia of efficiency is shown by long-lived capital and 
that which is most interconnected through infrastructure systems; 
this is true both for processes of adoption and of substitution 
with other technologies (Gruebler et al., 1999). To this should be 
added the cumulative learning processes associated with the 
market expansion of new technologies, which reduce costs and 
consolidate positive economic returns, even when there are 
changes in relative prices that are unfavourable to the newly-
adopted technology. 
Explicit investments in research and development, and in new 
innovations follow similar paths. Only stable favourable 
conditions, such as increases in energy prices believed to be 
lasting, trigger the process of investment in the research and 
development of new technologies up to the commercial stage. 
After this stage, there is a gradual diffusion of new technologies 39 
that follows logistic models (take-off, maturity, saturation and 
decline). As such, relative energy prices may act – to use 
Rosenberg’s terminology – as ‘focusing devices’, mechanisms 
which identify the most valuable areas of research and 
development and innovation. Except under extreme conditions of 
change, each cluster of innovations tends to start with earlier 
efficiency standards and raise them, partly driven by long-term 
research and development programmes, such as those of the 
European Union, which do not respond immediately to changes 
in economic variables. The current state of the energy market 
mainly has an impact on new research and innovation 
programmes, leading to different priorities in the allocation of 
financial resources. This is obvious from the history of scant 
attention to programmes for renewable energy sources when oil 
prices are low (regardless of environmental pressure). 
This interpretation of the irreversible effects and innovation 
inertia associated with strong or lasting changes in relative prices 
is also supported by evidence from historical price trends in real 
terms. 
Although the debate remains open, there is increasing evidence 
for the existence of long-term declining, or not increasing, trends 
in the prices of most raw materials and energy sources. In 
contrast to the hypothesis of increasing resource scarcity, the 
drop in real prices over the long term suggests relative 
abundance. The latter, combined with continuous gains in use 
efficiency, may support the hypothesis of a one-directional 
technological dynamics of the type described above. In fact, 
strong signs of scarcity, through phases of high real prices, 
induce increases in efficiency. However, the subsequent decline 
in real prices does not cause increased intensity in the use of 
energy and materials, given the inertia of fixed capital and 
programmes of investment in innovation. 
Efficiency thus tends to move in one direction towards the lower, 
more advanced, part of the Kuznets curve in accordance with 
mechanisms similar to those suggested by theories of growth 
stages, long waves and alternation between dominant 40 
technologies (Vasco, 1987; Rostow, 1990; Marchetti, 1991; 
Gruebler et al., 1999). 
Similar efficient innovation mechanisms are also at work for the 
supply of resources. Even when real prices are falling, the supply 
of energy and raw materials continues to increase, supported by 
the need to compensate for falling prices with higher quantities 
and by innovations which reduce extraction costs, and thus allow 
producers to maintain their rents. The role of cost saving 
innovations in maintaining high supply levels in the petroleum 
sector is well known (IEA, 2001b). 
In other words, the relative prices of energy and materials may 
act as initial driving forces in long-term dynamic processes 
which lead to changes in technological and production systems. 
These are capable of definitively changing the starting conditions 
to such an extent that subsequent inverse changes in relative 
prices do not have a symmetrical effect compared to increases. 
The unusual intensity of energy price changes during the 1970s 
may help to explain both the accelerated declining trend of 
energy intensities, and their non-reversal in response to the fall in 
real energy prices during the 1980s-1990s. However, it is true 
that the latter did decelerate innovation processes for efficiency, 
and this is an important issue for energy and climate change 
policies. 
 
6.2. Climate policies and technological innovation 
Despite their important role, changes in relative prices cannot be 
the only explanation for the observed innovation processes, since 
resources and the environment are subject to numerous public 
policies which influence the prices themselves, the quantities 
supplied and demanded, investments in research and 
development, and other variables. 
Specifically, taxation and regulation policies have traditionally 
played an important role in filtering changes in energy prices, 
altering them both in an amplificatory and compensatory way. 
Furthermore, the average levels and structure of energy prices 
are heavily differentiated in different countries, since energy 41 
products are subject to a variety of forms of taxation unparalleled 
in other sectors. Given that demand is relatively inelastic in the 
short term, the main aim of energy taxation is to increase 
revenues. 
However, the structure and level of prices determined by the tax 
burden may objectively have the effect of encouraging 
conservation and efficient technologies in the medium-to-long 
run or, conversely, may act as an implicit subsidy encouraging 
high consumption. In recent years, the emergence of concerns 
about the climate has become manifest in the introduction of 
energy-environmental taxes (in particular, Carbon-Energy Tax or 
CET) in various European countries. 
Such policies may introduce scarcity signals which, in the case 
of environmental resources such as the climate, cannot be 
provided by the market, thus stimulating also technological 
innovation. 
The current debate sees different positions on the economic and 
technological impact of energy-environmental policies (Jaffe et 
al., 2003). On the one hand, the hypothesis of a “loss of 
productivity/competitiveness” states that: energy conservation 
and emissions reduction policies create opportunity costs for the 
production system; these policies depress growth and the 
competitiveness of the most environmentally advanced countries; 
innovations to meet policy requirements crowd out innovation in 
other more productive areas of technology. On the other hand, 
the “Porter hypothesis” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) claims 
that: the investments induced by energy-environmental policies 
do not crowd out other investments; the policy-induced 
innovations can reduce compliance costs; investments in 
environmental innovation may generate competitive advantages 
for the technologies and products of the businesses which 
undertake them. 
Essentially, the whole debate revolves around whether or not 
energy-environmental policies stimulate innovation, if the latter 
is economically advantageous in terms of net social costs and if 
it can generate new market areas for investors. 42 
Although areas of agreement and dissent remain on this issue, 
the policy debate of the 1980s and 1990s led to a concentration 
on the costs and innovation effects (or the ‘dynamic efficiency’) 
of the objectives and tools adopted by the policies. Theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that the economic instruments have 
lower social costs than traditional policy instruments (restrictions 
on quantity, standards, controls, etc.) and may be more effective 
in stimulating innovation. In the case of energy and the climate, 
this first led to proposals to introduce carbon-energy taxes 
(CETs) and, subsequently, to proposals to create markets for 
tradable emissions permits (ET, Emissions Trading). 
CET proposals in Europe date back to the 1980s and have met 
with strong resistance from some countries and economic 
stakeholders, based on the hypothesis of a loss of 
productivity/competitiveness. 
They were sidelined after the Rio Conference in 1992, when the 
European proposal of a global carbon tax failed due to American 
resistance. Some European countries, however, have 
implemented domestic CETs. 
In contrast to the enormous number of ex ante simulations of the 
impact of CETs on the economic and technological system, there 
are few ex post analyses of their impact, which tell us little about 
effects on innovation in practice (Baranzini et al., 2000; 
Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2000). Generally speaking, it appears that 
this policy instrument has mainly had the effect of correcting the 
complex energy taxation system, with a dubious and probably 
negligible impact on both induced innovation and 
competitiveness. 
With the Kyoto Protocol, the emphasis has shifted towards the 
other main economic instrument for environmental policy, i.e. 
the creation of markets for tradable permits (in their two main 
forms, ‘cap and trade’, and ‘baseline and credit’). Initially 
proposed by the United States following numerous national 
applications to atmospheric pollutants, these instruments have 
become characteristic of the Kyoto Protocol and have generated 
a wide-ranging debate which is still open. After the refusal of the 43 
United States to ratify the Protocol in 2001, the EU has taken the 
lead in implementing these instruments, up to the creation of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2 
(Directive 2003/87/EC). The related Linking directive allows 
ETS operators to use carbon dioxide credits deriving from Joint 
Implementation (investments in Annex I countries, i.e. 
industrialized and transition countries) and Clean Development 
Mechanism (investments in non-Annex I countries, mainly 
developing ones) to comply with their obligations under the EU 
ETS. 
The European scheme started in 2005 and involves about 12,000 
businesses in the most emission-intensive sectors (from the 
production of thermoelectric power generation to the paper 
industry), accounting for about 40% of total emissions in the EU. 
With the EU  ETS, which is the largest emission market in the 
world, the hitherto small global CO2 market has taken off, 
generating a reference price for CO2 and thus an opportunity 
cost for emissions. The latter makes it advantageous to adopt 
abatement technologies or technological innovations able to 
conserve energy and reduce emissions. 
Also in the implementation of Kyoto instruments, induced 
innovation takes on a central role both in reducing the costs of 
attaining the objectives (Table 1) and in the possibility that 
Europe may play an important role in supplying efficient 





Generally speaking, it can be expected that the EU ETS is cost-
effective since it should lead to reductions in compliance costs 
(i.e. lower GDP losses) compared to other policy instruments 
with the same objectives. 
However, it is not clear if and how it can actually produce high 
incentives for innovation. The task of allocating emissions 
quotas has been assigned to individual EU countries, albeit 
conditional on the approval by the Commission. In general, 
countries have set CO2 emission quotas in a way which is not 
particularly restrictive, thus pursuing low costs implementation 
for national industries (in line with the loss of 
productivity/competitiveness hypothesis) and with discretional 
allocations among the national industries involved. 
The result is a certain global abundance of quotas compared to 
the Kyoto path; combined with an expected flow of low cost 
carbon credits from developing countries (from the 
implementation of the Linking directive) and Eastern 
Europe/Russia (so called ‘hot air’). This suggests a market 
development marked by low CO2 prices (from 6 to 15 €/tCO2eq 
according to the simulations
9). These low carbon prices will be 
unable to induce significant investments in emission reduction, 
                                                 
9 tCO2eq: tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. 45 
since they encourage operators to enter the market as purchasers 
of the reductions attained by others at a lower cost than their own 
reductions. The main effects on innovation will probably be 
limited to the adoption of existing technologies and their 
diffusion, partly on an international level through investments in 
joint implementation and clean development mechanisms. 
Only once low-cost reduction opportunities have been exhausted 
will CO2 prices rise and signal scarcity, inducing greater 
pressure to innovate. 
It is therefore uncertain if and when the development of the 
emission permits market will lead to innovations for energy and 
the environment in Europe, even compared to the United States. 
The latter’s climate policy is explicitly targeted at technological 
programmes and emissions intensity objectives, although these 
are not particularly restrictive and thus, per se, do not represent a 
significant incentive. 
The importance of energy-climate policy’s function as a dynamic 
incentive for innovation is stressed by the various analytical 
models of the impact of Kyoto which adopt ‘endogenous 
innovation’ hypotheses. However, these models emphasize the 
numerous difficulties in understanding actual innovation 
mechanisms (Carraro et al., 2003). For this reason, if policy tools 
are insufficient to generate the necessary innovations, new and 
explicit research and development policies for energy and the 
climate should be activated; at the same time, the large research 
programmes already underway in Europe and individual 
countries should be strengthened (Popp, 2004). 
From this point of view, it should be noted that energy and the 
environment are already of significant importance in European 
Union research programmes, with a specific budget of 4.8 billion 
of euro (10% of the total) in the VII Framework Programme 
currently underway, and may receive important input from other 
areas of innovation, such as materials and nanotechnologies. 
They also represent an important component of the National 
2005-2007 Research Programme launched in Italy. 46 
The possibility that innovation for the energy-climate may play a 
role in the Lisbon Strategy to make the Union’s economy more 
innovative is highlighted by the launch of the Environmental 
Technologies Action Plan (ETAP). The ETAP was adopted by 
the European Council in March 2004 (European Commission, 
2005) and clearly espouses the viewpoint here described as the 
Porter hypothesis, when it stresses that: a) environmental 
technologies employ more than 2 million people in the EU; b) 
the impact of environmental policies on employment is neutral or 
positive; c) the negative effects of pollution control policies on 
competitiveness are limited; d) environmental innovations may 
generate international market opportunities, given the increasing 
involvement of large, rapidly developing countries such as China 
in global energy-environment policies, especially in the post-
Kyoto scenario. 47 
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